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Abstract 
The reproductive number ℛ0 (and its value after initial disease emergence ℛ) has long been used to 
predict the likelihood of pathogen invasion, to gauge the potential severity of an epidemic, and to set 
policy around interventions. However, often ignored complexities have generated confusion around use 
of the metric. This is particularly apparent with the emergent pandemic virus SARS-CoV-2, the causative 
agent of COVID-19. We address some of these misconceptions, namely, how ℛ changes over time, 
varies over space, and relates to epidemic size by referencing the mathematical definition of ℛ and 
examples from the current pandemic. We hope that a better appreciation of the uses, nuances, and 
limitations of ℛ facilitates a better understanding of epidemic spread, epidemic severity, and the effects 
of interventions in the context of SARS-CoV-2. 
 
Introduction 
With the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus responsible for COVID-19, much attention 
has been given to the reproductive number, ℛ, and its initial state, ℛ0 (Viceconte and Petrosillo, 2020). 
ℛ0 is the expected number of infections generated by an infected individual in an otherwise fully 
susceptible population (Anderson and May, 1991; Diekmann et al., 1990). Under relatively general 
assumptions, ℛ0 can be used to determine the probability an emerging disease will cause an epidemic, 
the final size of an epidemic, and what level of vaccination would be required to achieve herd immunity 
(Anderson and May, 1991; Delamater et al., 2019; Heffernan et al., 2005; Roberts, 2007). Therefore, 
when interpreted correctly, and in conjunction with additional relevant information, it can yield valuable 
insight. However, misinterpretation may lead to faulty conclusions regarding disease dynamics.  
The virus, SARS-CoV-2 emerged in Wuhan, China in late 2019 and has since become pandemic 
causing over 413,000 deaths worldwide by June 10th, 2020 (“Johns Hopkins University & Medicine 
Coronavirus Resource Center,” 2020) in addition to severe economic distress. Policy makers have relied 
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on estimates of ℛ0 to tailor control measures (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2020), but these estimates vary 
tremendously within and between populations around the globe (Figure 1). It is important to 
understand why these estimates vary. It is also important to understand how the utility of ℛ is limited. 
Here, we derive and explain some of the key nuances of ℛ and ℛ0, paying particular attention to 
insights and limitations with respect to the emerging pathogen SARS-CoV-2. 
 
Figure 1. Estimates of the ℛ0 of SARS-CoV-2 vary substantially between locations affected by the 
pandemic (Chen et al., 2020; Choi and Ki, 2020; Deb and Majumdar, 2020; Giordano et al., 2020; 
Johndrow et al., 2020; Korolev, 2020; Lewnard et al., 2020; Q. Li et al., 2020; Tao Liu et al., 2020; 
Majumder and Mandl, 2020; Mizumoto et al., 2020; Peirlinck et al., 2020; Pitzer et al., 2020; Ranjan, 
2020; Read et al., 2020; Riou and Althaus, 2020; Sanche et al., 2020; Senapati et al., 2020; Shim et al., 
2020; Singh and Adhikari, 2020; Tang et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Yuan et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2020). 
Each point represents the average of a compilation of ℛ0 estimates from different studies (sample size 
noted alongside means). Median estimates were used for any studies that provided more than one 
estimate. Error bars show plus or minus 1 standard error.  
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Defining ℛ mathematically 
A general definition 
How many new infections will be caused by a single infected individual? For a directly transmitted 
pathogen, the answer to this question can be written as:  
ℛ = ∫ 𝑘𝜏𝑏𝜏𝑃𝜏 𝑑𝜏
∞
0
     (1) 
Above, ℛ is the reproductive number, 𝑘𝜏 is the rate of contacts that an infected individual has with 
susceptible individuals at time τ post infection, 𝑏𝜏 is the probability that a contact at time τ results in a 
new infection, and 𝑃𝜏 is the probability of still being infected at time τ. Notably, we could have combined 
𝑏𝜏 and 𝑃𝜏 into a single parameter since the probability of infection given contact falls to zero after an 
individual recovers, but we prefer this more explicit formulation. Equation (1) yields ℛ, the total number 
of infections one infected individual would generate over the course of their infection. When the 
population is fully susceptible, as would be expected at the beginning of an outbreak, equation (1) yields 
ℛ0. Note that we have neglected to explicitly incorporate individual variation and temporal variation in 
contact rates, the probability that a contact results in a new infection, and the time to recovery. 
However, ℛ and ℛ0, are intended to be averages, and so this variation is inherently a part of the 
reproductive number calculation. This variation could be explicitly included with additional subscripts to 
denote all possible infected hosts, noninfected hosts, times since the epidemic began, and ages of 
infections. For simplicity, hereafter, we will not use any subscripts for 𝑘, 𝑏, and 𝑃.  
 
Calculating ℛ0 using an epidemiological model 
Estimating the individual parameters in equation (1) requires extensive data collection for a 
specific pathogen, host population, and time. Alternative approaches to estimating ℛ0 therefore 
frequently rely on epidemiological models and epidemic data.  
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Following the lead of Kermack and McKendrick (1927), epidemics have often been modeled as a 
set of ordinary differential equations. In the simplest Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model, the 
state variables 𝑆, 𝐼, and 𝑅 are the densities of susceptible, infectious, and recovered individuals in a 
population. Note that “𝑅” here is distinct from the reproductive number “ℛ”, but we use both for 
historical reasons.  
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛽𝑆𝐼       (2.1) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=  𝛽𝑆𝐼 −  𝛾𝐼      (2.2) 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼      (2.3) 
Here, 𝛽 is the transmission coefficient of the pathogen and 𝛾 is the rate of recovery of infected 
individuals. Epidemiological data can be used to infer the values of model parameters, including for 
stochastic or more complex model formulations (for example, Kennedy et al., 2018).   
To derive ℛ0 from these equations, we put the SIR parameters in the context of equation (1). 
The per infected individual transmission rate, 𝛽𝑆, is equivalent to the contact rate an infected individual 
has with susceptible individuals, 𝑘, multiplied by the probability of a new infection resulting from a 
contact, 𝑏. Above, the rate of recovery 𝛾 is constant over time, meaning that the time individuals remain 
infected is exponentially distributed in this SIR model. The probability of remaining infected, 𝑃, is thus 
equal to 𝑒−𝛾𝜏, where 𝜏 is the time since infection. Therefore,  
ℛ0 = ∫ 𝛽𝑆𝑒
−𝛾𝜏𝑑𝜏
∞
0
     (3.1) 
Since 𝑆 changes slowly at the beginning of an epidemic when 𝐼 is small, we can treat it as a constant 
with respect to 𝜏. This assumption allows us to analytically solve the integral, which yields 
ℛ0 =
𝛽𝑆
𝛾
      (3.2) 
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However, most biological systems are unlikely to conform to the assumptions of this simple SIR model. 
The model can be modified to better reflect the biology of the system being modeled (for examples, see 
Keeling and Rohani, 2007) but added complexity can make ℛ0 more difficult or impossible to solve 
analytically. In these cases, ℛ0 can be calculated as the dominant eigenvalue of the next generation 
matrix (Diekmann et al., 1990) or by other mathematical methods (Heffernan et al., 2005).  
 
Calculating ℛ0 without an epidemiological model 
ℛ0 can also be estimated without an epidemiological model, which can be especially useful if parameter 
estimates or even an appropriate model structure are not yet known. In principle, one could calculate 
ℛ0 by simply counting the cases attributed to infected individuals at or near the beginning of an 
outbreak. In practice, this method is rarely employed since contact tracing networks are rarely 
established during the earliest phase of an emerging disease outbreak (but see Pung et al., 2020) and 
estimates could be inaccurate due to bias towards observing large chains of transmission.  
ℛ0 can also be inferred from the growth rate of cases early in an outbreak. Since the number of 
susceptible individuals changes slowly during the initial stages of an outbreak, early case growth rates 
can be approximated by exponential growth: the number of cases 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼0𝑒
𝑟𝑡, where 𝑟 is the epidemic 
growth rate. If the number of cases 𝐼 is known for at least two time points, one could calculate the 
epidemic growth rate 𝑟 =
ln(
𝐼𝑡
𝐼0
)
𝑡
. The relationship between ℛ0 and 𝑟 depends on the distribution of the 
generation interval 𝑇𝑐, which is defined as the amount of time between infection of two individuals 
where the second infection is caused by the first. 𝑇𝑐 can be approximated by direct observation or 
specified by an epidemiological model (Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007). For the model presented in eqs. 
(2.1)-(2.3) the generation interval is exponentially distributed, and therefore ℛ0 = 1 + 𝑟𝑇𝑐 (Wallinga 
and Lipsitch 2007). 
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No matter the method used to calculate it, limited data or unreliable data early in an epidemic 
can make it difficult to constrain ℛ0. The World Health Organization originally estimated the ℛ0 of 
SARS-CoV-2 to be between 1.4 and 2.5 (WHO, 2020). More recent estimates of ℛ0 have varied from 2.2 
to 6.47 for the beginning of the Wuhan outbreak (Figure 1). This represents tremendous uncertainty 
when attempting to use ℛ0 for public health planning. For example, if we were using these estimates to 
design a vaccine campaign capable of achieving herd immunity, our vaccination target (calculated as 1 −
1/ℛ0 under assumptions of eq. 2.1-2.3) would be 29% of the population at ℛ0=1.4 or 85% at ℛ0=6.47. 
Even with better estimates of ℛ0, however, misconceptions around this metric lessen its practical utility. 
 
Misconception 1: ℛ0 explains future dynamics 
As we have explained, ℛ0 is calculated during the early stages of an epidemic because of its value in 
determining future infection dynamics (Anderson and May, 1991; Ma and Earn, 2006). But ℛ changes 
over time in two important ways that limit its value in understanding future dynamics: first as awareness 
of infection leads hosts to alter their behavior, and second, as outbreaks progress and new hosts 
become limiting.   
Shifts in behavior that influence contact rates 𝑘 or the probability of infection given contact 𝑏 
can alter the reproductive number ℛ over extremely short timescales. For example, as awareness of the 
SARS-CoV-2 epidemic grew in the United States in March 2020, human mobility ground to a near halt 
(Gao et al., 2020; Warren and Skillman, 2020), presumably reducing contact rates 𝑘. Other individual 
behavioral changes such as increased handwashing and mask wearing (Belot et al., 2020; Goldberg et al., 
2020) have likely reduced the probability of transmission given contact 𝑏 (Liang et al., 2020). Such 
bottom-up forces combined with top-down government-imposed interventions (e.g. school closures, 
banned gatherings) reduced ℛ to below 1 (the threshold for epidemic persistence) by late April in some 
states (Johndrow et al., 2020; Miller et al., 2020). Similar reductions to ℛ were documented in China (R. 
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Li et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2020) and other countries (Ensser et al., 2020; Giordano et al., 2020; Yuan et 
al., 2020). Indeed, in models of the 1918 influenza pandemic, incorporating a behavioral response to 
death rates improved model fits (Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007; He et al., 2013). For SARS-CoV-2, 
behavioral changes may cause ℛ to fluctuate above and below 1 at different times based on the 
perceived threat of COVID-19. If that is the case, behavioral fluctuations and intermittent lockdowns 
may prevent hospital capacity from becoming overwhelmed (Tuite et al., 2020).  
While behavioral changes can temporarily reduce ℛ as described above, more sustainable 
reductions in ℛ are typically achieved when susceptible individuals are removed from populations either 
through naturally acquired immunity or vaccination. However, the impact of removing susceptible 
individuals is often more complicated than under assumptions of classical SIR models such as eq. 2.1-
2.3. When transmission rates are heterogeneous within a population, meaning that some individuals are 
more likely to contract infection than others, ℛ declines faster than predicted by eq. 2.1-2.3 (May and 
Anderson, 1987). This is because those most susceptible (for example, due to high exposure or lower 
inherent immunity) will become infected earlier in an epidemic, leaving a susceptible population that is 
on average more resistant (Gomes et al., 2020; Langwig et al., 2017; May and Anderson, 1987). This fact 
inherently limits the utility of the classical formulation of the “herd immunity” threshold, 1 − 1/ℛ0. 
Heterogeneity could be included in models to calculate a more realistic herd immunity threshold, but for 
SARS-CoV-2, data describing heterogeneity in infection risk are still highly uncertain and likely to 
continue changing through time due to individual or government-mandated responses (Dolbeault and 
Turinici, 2020). Indeed, current estimates of the fraction of people infected with SARS-CoV-2, in the 
hardest hit communities (e.g. 15.5% in a small German town exposed to a super spreading event 
(Streeck et al., 2020) and 19.9% in New York City (“Information on novel coronavirus,” 2020)) may be 
approaching thresholds required for herd immunity calculated under assumptions of extreme 
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heterogeneity conditions (Gomes et al., 2020), but if heterogeneity in transmission is not extreme or if it 
decreases in the future, herd immunity thresholds will also shift higher.  
 
Misconception 2: The reproductive number is constant over space 
The ℛ0 of many pathogens are often referred to as known values. For example, the ℛ0 of measles is 12-
14, polio is 5-7, and pertussis is 12-17 (Doherty et al., 2016). For SARS-CoV-2, estimates typically range 
from 2-3 (Ying Liu et al., 2020). However, the parameters (𝑘, 𝑏, and 𝑃) that make up ℛ0 can differ 
substantially from place to place (Figure 1, Delamater et al., 2019). It follows that interventions to 
reduce ℛ to less than 1 may need to vary in aggressiveness across locations (Stier et al. 2020).  
Since ℛ0 differs between groups of people, combining multiple groups together to estimate a 
population-wide ℛ0 can produce misleading notions of disease spread. For example, though high 
measles vaccination rates in the United States keep ℛ below 1 nation-wide, smaller unvaccinated 
communities still experience serious outbreaks (Leslie et al., 2018). In the current COVID-19 pandemic, 
disease transmission has so far been much higher in refugee and low income populations compared to 
non-refugee and high income populations (Chopra and Sobel, 2020; Lau et al., 2020; Ruiz-Euler et al., 
2020). Since ℛ0 is an average, combining communities with high and low transmission may yield an 
estimate of ℛ0<1, yet disease may still readily spread (Li et al., 2011). On the other hand, splitting 
populations may mean missing transmission events that occur between populations, thus 
underestimating ℛ0 (Smith et al., 2009).  
Awareness of the consequences of how people are grouped can help us interpret ℛ values. 
Within groups, behavior associated with work, home, and recreation affects contact rates 𝑘. As we have 
discussed above, SIR models often assume that contact rates, and thus ℛ0, depend on host density. 
Although, evidence is mixed as to whether larger cities have higher values of ℛ0 for SARS-CoV-2 (Heroy, 
2020; Stier et al., 2020), built environments (e.g. hospitals, airport terminals, factories) do often have 
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high values of ℛ0 (Dietz et al., 2020). This may partially explain patterns of explosive transmission in 
venues such as cruise ships and meat packing facilities (Althouse et al., 2020; Dyal et al., 2020; 
Mizumoto and Chowell, 2020). Household contacts have also been particularly important to SARS-CoV-2 
transmission dynamics (Bi et al., 2020). Therefore, differences in ℛ0 between populations could in part 
be due to the difference in household sizes between countries and cultures (Gardner et al., 2020; Singh 
and Adhikari, 2020; Su et al., 2020). Similarly, the probability a new infection results from contact 𝑏 and 
probability of remaining infected over time 𝑃 may vary by population. For SARS-CoV-2, individuals with 
severe symptoms have 60 times more viral RNA in nasal swabs, which likely increases their ability to 
transmit the virus and the amount of time they remain infected (Yang Liu et al., 2020). Since older 
individuals are more likely to develop severe infection (Yang et al., 2020), ℛ0 is likely to be greater in 
populations with older individuals, such as in nursing homes (McMichael et al., 2020) or in developed 
countries (Dowd et al., 2020).   
 
Misconception 3: The reproductive number is enough to tell us how large an epidemic will be 
It is tantalizing to imagine that ℛ0 can be used to predict the extent an outbreak, since it can be 
calculated during the early stages of an epidemic. Indeed ℛ0 is related to final epidemic size (Kermack 
and McKendrick, 1927), but this relationship can be substantially affected by the fraction of the 
population infected initially and heterogeneity in transmission.   
If we rescale population sizes such that the initial susceptible population size 𝑆0 = 1, and we 
assume that population sizes are sufficiently large to neglect demographic stochasticity (Hartfield and 
Alizon, 2013; Tildesley and Keeling, 2009), then 𝑍, the fraction of the population infected during an 
epidemic, can be determined from the final epidemic size equation, 𝑍 = 𝑆0(1 − 𝑒
−ℛ0(𝑍−𝐼0)). Note that 
this equation prominently features 𝐼0, the fraction of the population infected at the beginning of the 
outbreak (or at the beginning of an intervention). Efforts to reduce the reproductive number below 1 
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are understandably a high priority, but when ℛ0 is close to or less than 1, the final outbreak size is more 
sensitive to changes in the fraction of infected individuals 𝐼0 than it is to changes in ℛ0 (Figure 2). ℛ0 is a 
critical threshold for pathogen invasion, which matters when 𝐼0 is small, but which becomes less 
important as 𝐼0 gets larger (Figure 2). Now that SARS-CoV-2 infection rates are already substantial in 
populations around the globe, 𝐼 must be considered in addition to ℛ. For example, Pei et al. (2020) 
estimated that implementing social distancing policies one week earlier could have reduced the cases in 
the United States by early May, 2020 by 55% (over 700,000 cases) by keeping the number of infected 
individuals low at the time such policies were implemented.  
 
Figure 2. Epidemic size contours and shading show that when ℛ0 is close to 1, the epidemic is more 
strongly influenced by a reduction of 𝐼0 than by a reduction of ℛ0. For instance, if ℛ0 = 0.95 (red 
dashed line), the epidemic could infect from less than 0.1% to greater than 16% of the population as 𝐼0 
ranges from 0% to 3% of the population. Epidemic size was calculated using the final size equation, 𝑍 =
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𝑆0(1 − 𝑒
−ℛ0(𝑍−𝐼0)), where 𝑆0=1. Shading indicates the cube root of epidemic size with lighter colors 
corresponding to smaller outbreaks. 
 
While a final epidemic size can be calculated using ℛ0 and 𝐼0, the final size equation above does 
not apply to populations with heterogeneous infection risk (Andreasen, 2011; Ball, 1985; Hébert-
Dufresne et al., 2020; Ma and Earn, 2006). Heterogeneity could in principle be incorporated into the 
final epidemic size equation (Dwyer et al., 2000), but estimating heterogeneity early in an epidemic can 
be challenging. Moreover, as we describe in misconception 1, heterogeneity in infection risk can change 
over time as a result of human behavior or interventions, such as for example the shutdowns in 
response to the COVID-19 epidemic (Dolbeault and Turinici, 2020; Ruiz-Euler et al., 2020). Estimates of 
how future government restrictions and behavioral changes will alter heterogeneity in infection risk are 
thus critical for assessing the likely impact of the outbreak (Gomes et al., 2020). Such estimates are also 
key in determining thresholds for herd immunity and in prioritizing the distribution of interventions such 
as vaccines when they first become available (Atkinson and Cheyne, 1994; Giambi et al., 2019).  
 
Conclusions 
As we have discussed, the reproductive number ℛ and its initial value ℛ0 can be used to assess the 
potential for disease invasion and persistence, to predict the extent of an epidemic, and to infer the 
impact of interventions and of relaxing control measures. However, the utility of ℛ and ℛ0 can easily be 
overstated. We have focused on three misconceptions that can lead to inaccurate perceptions of 
disease dynamics. These misconceptions are problematic no matter the complexity of the model or the 
reliability of the data used to estimate ℛ because populations vary over space and time and in their 
changing responses to disease. Considering these nuances when interpreting ℛ allows for a stronger 
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understanding of the patterns with which SARS-CoV-2 virus has traversed the globe, why it has impacted 
some populations more than others, and how best to limit future transmission.  
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